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Abstract 
Several studies have reported that parents are often reluctant to vaccinate their 
own or other people’s children, even when the balance of health risks and benefits clearly 
favors vaccination. This reluctance has been interpreted as a manifestation of “omission 
bias”, a general tendency to prefer inactive to active options even when inaction leads to 
worse outcomes or greater risks. The research raises significant public health concerns as 
well as worries about human decision biases in general. In this paper we argue that 
existing research on vaccination decisions has not convincingly demonstrated any general 
reluctance to vaccinate nor has it made the case that such a tendency, if found, would 
constitute a bias. We identify several conceptual and methodological issues that, we 
argue, cloud interpretation of earlier studies.  In a new questionnaire-based study we 
examined the vaccination decisions of undergraduate students (N=103) and non-student 
adults (N=192). In both groups a clear majority chose to vaccinate when disease and 
vaccination risks were balanced. Vaccination intentions appear to be less a function of 
generalized preferences for action or inaction than they are of the regret respondents 
expect to feel if vaccination or non-vaccination were to lead to a poor outcome. Regret-
avoiding choices led some respondents to favor vaccination, others to oppose it. In two 
follow-up studies, few respondents mentioned action or inaction per se in explaining their 
choices. Finally a series of methodological studies suggests the likely sources of 
misleading results in earlier studies. 
 
Key words: Vaccination, regret, omission bias, action, justification. 
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A number of studies have reported an “omission bias” in decision making, a tendency 
towards “… the choice of a potentially harmful omission over a potentially less harmful 
act” (Asch et al. 1994: 118), or “… to favor omissions (such as letting someone die) over 
otherwise equivalent commissions (such as killing someone actively)” (Ritov & Baron, 
1990: 263). Ritov and Baron (1990), for example, offered students a (hypothetical) 
choice between exposing a child to a disease with some risk of death and giving a 
protective vaccine with some risk of lethal side-effects. Most subjects demanded that the 
vaccine risk be significantly smaller than the disease risk before they would vaccinate 
(i.e. take action). Spranca, Minsk and Baron (1991: Experiment 4) asked subjects to 
judge a physician’s (hypothetical) decision on whether or not to recommend a risky brain 
surgery that would cure a disease that threatened permanent brain injury. In some cases 
the surgery was described as higher in risk, in others the disease itself was riskier. The 
subjects, unsurprisingly, preferred the less risky option in each case, but generally rated 
the inactive option as better, or as less bad, than the corresponding active option. Spranca 
et al. (1991) found that subjects judged the active theft of $100 to be morally worse than 
merely failing to point out a store’s $100 error in one’s favor (Experiment 5). Their 
subjects also judged the active poisoning of a tennis opponent to be more immoral than 
simply failing to warn him of a suspect dish (Experiment 1). Baron (1992: Experiment 1) 
found large majorities of subjects reluctant to commit a single murder even if it would 
lead to saving the lives of two other individuals. The effect known as omission bias thus 
touches on important issues of medical, ethical and mundane decision making. 
As many of these authors note, a plausible psychological mechanism underlying 
the effect relies on an association between active choice and increased regret. The classic 
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demonstration of this effect is that of Kahneman and Tversky (1982) in their example of 
two investors who lose the same moderate amount of money, one by changing his 
portfolio, the other by failing to change it. By a huge majority, subjects judged that the 
investor who actively changed would feel more regret over his loss than would the 
investor who sat still. There is now a considerable literature on this linkage between 
action and regret. Kahneman and Miller (1986) propose that, in many contexts, taking 
action is more “abnormal” than inaction, and this abnormality amplifies emotions (such 
as regret) associated with a bad outcome. Gilovich & Medvec (1995) report evidence of a 
reversal of the linkage over time, with inaction more strongly associated with regret in 
the longer term. Landman (1987) examined the converse linkage of positive outcomes 
and such emotions as rejoicing.  Other authors have examined its connection to decision 
responsibility (Connolly, Ordóñez  & Coughlan, 1997; Zeelenberg, van Dijk & 
Manstead, 1998); and the relationship between real and imagined regrets (Feldman, 
Miyamoto & Loftus, 1999; Crawford, McConnell, Lewis & Sherman, 2002). 
There thus appear to be two converging bodies of evidence pointing to an 
important decisional bias. First, there are numerous studies (Baron, in personal 
correspondence, claims some 30 experiments by himself and others) that have reported 
omission bias in a variety of contexts. Second, there is a plausible mechanism, the action-
regret linkage, by which to account for a generalized reluctance to take action when 
consequences of action and inaction are roughly balanced. This convergence has led a 
number of authors (e.g. Asch et al., 1993; Meszaros et al., 1996) to voice concern that 
important medical benefits such as childhood vaccinations are being significantly 
 6
underused. The broader issue of a possible widespread reluctance to vaccinate is of 
obvious current concern in light of terrorist bioweapons threats. 
A close examination of the evidence, however, raises questions about both 
omission bias and its supposed link to anticipated regret. In the next section of the paper 
we review a number of findings that suggest that action is not invariably associated with 
increased regret. In the following section we examine the omission bias literature itself, 
particularly focusing on vaccination decisions. We find a number of conceptual and 
methodological concerns that raise questions both about the prevalence of omission (non-
vaccination) and about the claim that it reflects a bias. We then report a scenario-based 
study of vaccination decisions, examining participants’ preferences for vaccination and 
non-vaccination, and the role of anticipated regret in these preferences. The concluding 
section of the paper discusses both theoretical and practical implications of these results. 
An appendix develops a formal model of risk-balancing in decisions like vaccination and 
derives some unintuitive implications. A second appendix reports several methodological 
studies that point to plausible sources of earlier misleading results. 
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The linkage between action and regret 
As noted above a number of earlier studies found evidence that poor decision 
outcomes are more regretted when they are the result of action than of inaction. Several 
recent studies have raised questions about the invariance of this relationship. First, both 
in our own work (Connolly et al., 1997; Ordóñez  & Connolly, 2000) and in studies by 
Zeelenberg et al. (1998), subjects anticipated significant levels of regret over poor 
outcomes for which they had no decision responsibility. Further, between-subject studies 
(N’gbala & Branscombe, 1997; Connolly & Reb, 2001) do not replicate the within-
subject results of Kahneman & Tversky (1992) in the two-investors problem. (See also 
Sevdalis & Harvey, 2001). Second, in Connolly and Reb (2001) and in Zeelenberg, van 
den Bos, van Dijk and Pieters (2001), the key issue seems to be less whether or not the 
agent took action, but whether or not this (in)action was justified (see Connolly and 
Zeelenberg, 2002). In Zeelenberg et al (2001), for example, a soccer coach who changes 
his team and then loses was seen as feeling regret over this action only if the team’s 
previous record did not justify the change. If the team had been doing poorly, the change 
was seen as appropriate, and the subsequent loss attracted little regret. Similarly Seta, 
McElroy and Seta (2001) found that regret was associated with action only when the 
(in)action taken was inconsistent with the agent’s personality or prior record. Kahneman 
and Miller (1986) propose that perceived normalcy is a common justificatory rationale, 
and that inaction is, in many – but not necessarily all – contexts, the normal (and thus 
more readily justified) choice.  
Since justifiability is likely to be context-dependent, and to vary across 
individuals, these demonstrations weaken the assumed robustness of the action-regret 
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linkage. For some people and settings, action may be seen as less justified, and thus more 
regrettable, than inaction but it seems clear that the reverse may also be true for other 
people and other settings. There are, of course, other mechanisms that might shape a 
tendency to prefer inaction. Baron and Ritov (1994), for example, suggest both an 
“inaction heuristic”, a generalized rule of avoiding direct harm, and an alternative 
account based on loss aversion. Before pressing further with rival explanations, however, 
we should examine the robustness of the phenomenon itself. How strong is the evidence 
for a generalized tendency to prefer inaction in realistic choice contexts? 
Studies of moral intuitions. 
Two lines of evidence are commonly cited in support of the idea that humans 
predominantly prefer inactions (omissions) to actions. One line of work concerns our 
moral intuitions on matters such as killing someone rather than allowing someone to die, 
stealing money versus not correcting an equivalent error in one’s favor or, more 
generally, actively causing a bad event to happen rather than passively allowing it to 
happen. Many of the demonstrations are, by design, quite far from the everyday 
experience of the subjects: an opportunity to win a tennis game by poisoning an 
internationally famous tennis star (Spranca et al., 1991), to save lives by deflecting the 
path of a run-away railroad car (Petrinovitch & O’Neill, 1996) or to protect another 
person by intercepting a bullet in a shopping-mall shoot-out (Royzman & Baron, 1999). 
These ingeniously contrived scenarios are more in the spirit of illustrations from 
introductory ethics textbooks than samples of the real lives of real people. They gain their 
exemplary power precisely because they assume away such realistic details as how the 
respondent is to know that the gunman has only a single bullet and unerring aim, and will 
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kill, with certainty, exactly one person; or how the tennis player is to know that his 
opponent will be sickened but not killed by the tainted salad dressing, or that his own 
pleasure in winning will be undiminished by his dinner-time trickery. As Petrinovich and 
O’Neill (1996) note in a review of such studies, “Philosophers often create fantasy moral 
dilemmas to investigate the nature of moral beliefs and intuitions” (p.146; emphasis 
added); and Baron (1992:322) notes of a hostage murder scenario, “… I assumed that the 
case was not realistic”.  These stories are contrived to probe a moral intuition, not to 
model a realistic choice. Thus, Petrinovitch and O’Neill (1996: 149) instruct their 
subjects: “Accept only the information given and try not to introduce additional 
assumptions that go beyond the problem as stated. Although some of the questions might 
appear artificial…”.  
These fantasy moral dilemma studies commonly find a preference for inaction: 
active or direct evil-doing is often judged more reprehensible that indirect or passive 
tolerance of evil. (Spranca et al., 1991; Haidt & Baron, 1996; Royzman & Baron, 1999; 
Petrinovitch & O’Neill, 1996). The pattern is not invariable, however. Recent work by 
Tanner and Medin (2002), for example, identifies a number of issues in which common 
moral intuitions appear to call for action, and inaction is seen as morally deplorable. 
Where the earlier studies appear to have identified a range of moral issues in which the 
dominant rule is “Thou shalt not”, the more recent work identifies other issues in which 
the preferred rule is “Thou shalt”. It is, anyway, unlikely that such moral intuitions are 
the predominant drivers of real, mundane decisions such as flu vaccination. 
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Studies of realistic decisions 
 Although much of the literature on “omission bias” in mundane decisions seems 
to postulate a rather broad and general tendency towards inaction, it is quite possible that 
the same individuals may display such a tendency in one class of decisions but not 
another. Doctors, for example, have been found to be reluctant to take action in some 
contexts where action might be justified (Cohen and Pauker, 1994), while appearing 
over-eager to take action in others where such action is harder to support (Ayanian and 
Berwick, 1991). We will therefore focus here specifically on one important class of 
decisions, those involving vaccination, leaving for later study the question of whether or 
not our findings generalize to other settings in which omission bias has been claimed.  
Major studies of vaccination decisions include Asch et al (1994); Baron (1992, 
Experiments 1 and 2); Baron and Ritov, (1994, Experiment 4); Meszaros et al, (1996); 
Ritov and Baron (1990, 1998, Experiment 4) --  a total of 10 studies involving some 900 
participants. All have reported data suggesting that a substantial number, often a 
majority, of participants are reluctant to vaccinate when vaccination and disease risks 
appear comparable or favor vaccination. All have interpreted this reluctance as evidence 
of “omission bias”. The central thrust of this paper is to challenge both of these claims, 
on several grounds. 
The first worry concerns measurement methods. In laboratory studies of real-
world vaccination decisions, the most commonly used measures of omission tendency 
ask the respondent to balance risks between two options. For example in Asch et al 
(1994), the respondent was told that her child is exposed to a specified risk of contracting 
a flu, and that an effective but potentially risky vaccine is available. How safe must the 
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vaccine be before the respondent would vaccinate her child? In the Asch et al study, 
respondents demanded a sizable risk premium (vaccine risk less than 40% of flu risk) 
before they would vaccinate, a result the authors interpreted as indicating a strong 
preference for inaction (not vaccinating) over action (vaccinating). The logic of this 
measure is developed in more detail in Appendix 1. 
 There are a number of problems in this risk-balancing approach. First, of course, 
it supposes that the subject can approximate the complex balance of utilities and 
probabilities represented in Equation 1. This is not a trivial task. (See Connolly, 1985, for 
a discussion of the unintuitive results of such utility/probability balancing in another 
context of binary choice under risk, the juror’s assessment of “reasonable doubt”). 
Second, the logic of the measure is compelling only if one assumes that the respondent 
considers the facts provided by the experimenter as appropriate for her decision – for 
example, that the population flu risk given is appropriate for her child, and that the 
vaccine risk is honestly presented by the manufacturer. If Asch et al’s respondents 
assumed that the vaccine manufacturer was understating the real risk, or that their 
children were healthier or better-protected than the average child, then their demand for a 
risk premium could have been simply a way of equating real risk between the two 
options.  
Second, interpreting the risk premium as a measure of preference for inaction 
requires one to make the strong assumption that the subject considers only the outcome 
elements specified in the scenario by the experimenter (the state of the child’s health and 
one’s horror at directly causing harm). This assumption may be defensible in a 
deliberately artificial scenario aimed at isolating a moral intuition (see Petrinovitch and 
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O’Neill’s instructions to their subjects, quoted above). However, in studies of realistic 
decisions such as vaccination, it seems undesirable (and, perhaps, impossible) to exclude 
factors that parents would, in fact, consider in making their decisions. Our interest is not 
what they might do in an artificial world but what they would do in the real world. In the 
context of a real vaccination decision a parent’s choice might be shaped by innumerable 
other factors other than those specified in the researcher’s scenario: a horror of needle-
pricks, the cost of, distance to and inconvenience of vaccination clinics, the ability 
vaccination allows to control the timing of the child’s possible sickness, the relevance 
and trustworthiness of the probabilities offered (Meszaros et al., 1996), the support or 
disapproval of her friends, altruistic, free-riding, and herd immunity considerations 
(Hershey, Asch, Thumasathit, Meszaros & Waters, 1994), exposure to nagging by 
medical personnel or to sick children in a clinic waiting-room, reluctance to engage in 
complex risk/benefit assessments and any number of other factors. At best, the risk-
balancing measure reflects the aggregate influence of multiple factors such as these -- a 
list that may or may not include action or inaction per se. An individual who is 
disinclined to vaccinate, or who demands a risk premium to do so, might be revealing a 
preference for inaction per se, but might just as plausibly be revealing any of a dozen 
other preferences. Reluctance to vaccinate, in short, is only the most tenuous evidence for 
a general reluctance to act. 
A third concern with the risk premium evidence is that there may have been 
inadvertent bias in the response scales used. In Asch et al.’s study, the only responses 
allowed were those indicating a risk premium favoring the vaccine. Respondents who 
indicated a preference for vaccination even if it were riskier than the flu were simply 
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excluded, as “suggesting they had misunderstood the question” (p.121). In Ritov and 
Baron (1990: Experiments 1 and 2), similarly, only responses indicating vaccine risk less 
than flu risk were allowed. In their Experiment 4, vaccine risk was specified and 
respondents indicated the lowest flu risk at which they would vaccinate. The responses 
were thus bounded below at zero, but unbounded above, so that the means would have 
been inflated by any large-number responses participants used to register reluctance to 
vaccinate under any circumstances. (We present evidence in Appendix 2 that the 
measurement procedures used in these earlier studies do indeed produce distortions of 
exactly these sorts.)  
The final, and perhaps most telling, concern with the risk balancing approach is 
simply that it produces extraordinary numbers. As noted above the subjects in Asch et al. 
(1994) demanded risk premiums implying that they typically felt that a child’s death from 
vaccine was about 2.5 times as bad as is death from flu, and a similar result is implied in 
Meszaros et al. (1996). We find this ratio surprising, but not entirely unbelievable. 
However, equivalent questions in Ritov and Baron (1990, Experiment 4: 274) imply 
ratios ranging from 10:1 (Case 3) to 258:1 (Case 1). The authors interpret these results as 
indicating an “immense omission bias” (p.274) on the part of their subjects, though 
without explaining why this bias should vary to such an extraordinary degree from study 
to study. We develop an alternative interpretation, based on measurement bias, later in 
the paper. Whatever the interpretation, one must surely treat with suspicion a procedure 
that produces utility estimates that vary across studies by a factor of more than 100, and 
where the highest estimate indicates that one’s grief at the death of a child is less than 1% 
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due to the death per se, more than 99% to one’s agency in bringing it about. (Appendix 1: 
Example 2). 
 In summary, we see the risk balancing procedure as having several weaknesses. It 
requires the subject to make complex tradeoffs of utility and probability; it requires the 
experimenter to make strong assumptions about what elements are included in the 
subject’s model and how these elements are valued; its implementations to date appear to 
have inadvertently incorporated measurement bias; and it yields implausible and widely 
varying numerical estimates of the outcome utilities. The methodological experiments 
reported in Appendix 2 strongly suggest (a) that the procedure is flawed, and (b) that the 
flaws would lead directly to a mistaken inference that most respondents are vaccination 
averse (though, as we have argued above, this is still a long way from demonstrating 
omission bias). 
The problem of requiring a respondent to make numerical estimates of acceptable 
risk can be avoided if he or she is simply given a choice between two options, as in Baron 
(1992: Experiment 1) where subjects were asked whether they “should”, and whether 
they “would”, vaccinate their own child against a flu with a 10 in 10,000 mortality rate if 
the vaccine had a 5 in 10,000 mortality rate. On balance we prefer this choice procedure 
to the numerical risk estimating procedure (though see Appendix 2, Experiment M 2, for 
evidence that it may still retain measurement error problems). However, even if the 
procedure is interpreted as capturing the respondent’s real preference, it does not 
establish that the preference is biased in the sense of showing a departure from a 
generally agreed-upon normative standard. To establish bias, one must further assume  
(a) that the only outcomes that should be considered are those shown in Equation 1, and 
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(b) that the respondent should value both good outcomes equally, and both bad outcomes 
equally. Neither normative claim seems self-evidently true. Why should a parent not 
consider other factors, such as those sketched earlier? And why should no allowance be 
made, for example, for an element of parental rejoicing when a prudent choice rather than 
simple luck heads off a child’s illness? Both normative assertions are required before a 
preference for inaction compels a verdict of error. Whether the evidence suggests a 
predominant tendency towards or against vaccination, there seems to be no clear basis to 
claim that such a tendency would be a bias. 
Prior questionnaire studies of vaccination preference 
 In light of the methodological concerns discussed above, and the widely varying 
results reported in the studies, it is difficult to assess from existing studies the distribution 
of vaccination preferences in the general public.  Asch et al. (1994) intentionally selected 
a sample of adults markedly more hostile to vaccination than the general public: the 
subscribers to Mothering magazine, a journal somewhat opposed to conventional 
medicine, and in which several articles opposing diptheria-pertussis-tetanus (DPT) 
vaccine had recently appeared. They found a mean anti-vaccine risk premium of 
approximately 2.5:1 (after eliminating two respondents who indicated a pro-vaccine risk 
premium). Using a similar sample, Meszaros et al. (1996) found almost no risk premium 
for self-reported vaccinators, and about 2.2 for self-reported non-vaccinators. Using 
student subjects, Ritov and Baron (1990), found a tendency to anti-vaccination risk 
premiums in their Experiments 1 and 2 , with wide variation depending on whether the 
same or different children were affected by flu and vaccine. Their Experiment 4 yielded 
the extraordinarily large anti-vaccine risk premiums discussed earlier (ranging up to 
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256:1). Baron (1992, Experiment 1), in a scenario offering a pro-vaccine risk premium of 
2:1, found more than 80% of subjects thought they should, and 70% that they would, 
vaccinate, and both percentages rose to above 90% after a brief persuasive message. 
Baron and Ritov (1994, Experiment 4) found 19% of subjects leaning against vaccination 
even with a vaccine risk premium of 10:1, and about 50% doing so when risks were 
roughly equal, though 12% were pro-vaccine even when vaccine risks were 1.3 times flu 
risks. Ritov and Baron (1995, Experiment 4) found a small majority (57%) willing to 
vaccinate when vaccine and flu risks were approximately equal, and only 4% unwilling to 
take any vaccine risk. Ritov and Baron (1999) similarly report that a minority of their 
sample held avoidance of risky vaccination as a “protected value” for which they were 
not prepared to make any tradeoffs. We are hesitant to attempt a summary of these widely 
varying responses, other than to note that (a) most of the data suggest that at least some 
respondents are reluctant to vaccinate when significant risk is involved in doing so; (b) all 
the studies reviewed involve one or more of the measurement problems discussed in 
Appendix 2. 
The present study 
The study reported here had two purposes. First, given the practical public health 
issues involved, we wished to assess preferences for a hypothetical flu vaccination in two 
populations, students and non-student adults. Second, we wished to examine the 
possibility that regret avoidance might offer a more compelling account of vaccination 
preferences than does a hypothetical general aversion to taking action (i.e. “omission 
bias”). In addition to simply measuring vaccination preferences, the study examines the 
extent to which respondents expect to feel regret if they were to experience a bad 
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outcome from either vaccination or non-vaccination. It also examines the relationship 
between these anticipated regrets and the respondents’ readiness to choose vaccination 
for their children.  
We used a scenario in which the negative outcomes of vaccination and non-
vaccination were described as equally likely, and as very similar in content, so that no 
complex balancing of probabilities and utilities was required of the participants. The 
logic of the simple risk-balancing model would predict indifference between vaccination 
and non-vaccination for this case. Any general tendency toward omission (inaction) 
should thus shift the predominant choice sharply in the direction of non-vaccination. We 
also included measures of regret and several other negative emotions that the respondents 
might associate with the two bad outcomes, to allow us to test the hypothesis that 
respondent choices will be regret avoiding. Method and results are described in the 
following sections. 
 
Method 
Task. Participants read a scenario in which they were asked to imagine themselves in the 
role of a parent having to decide whether or not to vaccinate his or her small child. The 
scenario, modified from one used by Asch et al. (1994) and Ritov and Baron (1990), read 
as follows: 
“Imagine that, in Arizona, there have been several outbreaks of a certain 
kind of flu, which can cause severe illness in children under three. Only a small 
number of children exposed actually catch this flu, but for those who do it’s quite 
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severe. The children get very sick with high fevers, a lot of pain, and generally 
feel horrible for several weeks. 
A vaccine for this kind of flu has been developed and tested. The vaccine 
eliminates any possibility of the child getting the flu. The vaccine, however, can 
sometimes cause side-effects that are very similar to the severe flu symptoms: 
high fever, pain, feeling horrible. Fortunately, these unpleasant effects are rare. In 
fact, the risk of a vaccinated child getting the unpleasant side-effects is about as 
low as the chance of a non-vaccinated child getting severe flu symptoms. 
Imagine that you are married and have one child, a one-year old. You have 
spent a lot of time trying to decide whether or not to have the child vaccinated 
against this flu. After talking to several doctors, reading medical journals and 
consulting with friends it’s now time to decide whether to have your child 
vaccinated or not.” 
Participants. The study included two different groups of participants. The first (N=192) 
were recruited in the jury waiting room of a large Southwestern city. Volunteers 
completed questionnaires while waiting to be called for jury service. The pool was 
predominantly (61%) women, and ranged in age from 19 to 78 with a mean of 41.8 years.  
60% reported themselves currently married, 13% divorced or widowed, 26% single. Most 
(86%) reported that they had received at least some college education. Sixty-seven 
percent reported having one or more children. The second group (N=103) were business 
undergraduates at a large Southwestern university, participating for course credit. The 
sample included a majority (55%) of men, and ranged in age from 19 to 39, with a mean 
of 21.1 years. Only one student reported having children. The student sample is thus 
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typical of the young and mainly childless samples used in earlier studies, while the juror 
sample is more closely representative of the larger adult population: older, predominantly 
married, and with parenting experience.  
Measures.  
Vaccination intention. After reading the scenario, participants were asked: “How 
would you decide?” They indicated their vaccination intention on a seven-point scale 
anchored at –3: Definitely not vaccinate; 0: Don’t know; and +3: Definitely vaccinate. 
They were also asked, on two similar scales, what they would decide if, instead of the 
equal risks stated in the scenario, the risk of a vaccinated child getting the unpleasant 
side-effects were (a) higher or (b) lower than the risk of an unvaccinated child getting the 
severe flu symptoms. 
Emotion ratings. Respondents were asked to assess the extent to which they 
would experience each of 11 emotions if their vaccination decision were to turn out 
badly. On one page, the respondents were asked to imagine their feelings if their 
vaccinated child experienced the severe side-effects. On a second page they were asked 
about their feelings if their unvaccinated child experienced the severe flu symptoms. The 
emotions assessed were regret, self-blame, guilt, anger, shame, responsibility, 
dissatisfaction with self, disappointment, sadness, pain and happiness. A short header 
preceded both instruments: 
“Suppose you [did decide] [decided not] to vaccinate. Unfortunately, your 
child is one of those who has the [bad vaccine side-effects] [severe flu 
symptoms]: high fever, a lot of pain, and several weeks of feeling very sick. 
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How much do you think you would experience each of the following feelings 
in this situation?” 
Responses were on 0 to 10 scales anchored at 0: I wouldn’t experience this at all, and 10: 
I would experience this a lot. 
Relative seriousness ratings. Participants were asked on a final page: 
“From what you understand of the story, how do the severe flu symptoms and 
the vaccine side-effects compare in terms of overall seriousness? Would you 
say that (check one): 
( ) The severe flu symptoms are more serious overall than the vaccine side-
effects. 
( ) The severe flu symptoms are less serious overall than the vaccine side-
effects. 
( ) The severe flu symptoms are just as serious overall as the vaccine side-
effects.” 
A response indicating flu symptoms were perceived as less serious was coded as –1, 
equally serious as 0, and more serious as 1. To control for possible question-order effects, 
half of the questionnaires were assembled with emotion ratings preceding the vaccination 
intention questions. Within each, half of the emotion ratings addressed side-effects first, 
the other half addressed severe flu first.  
Results 
Overall a clear majority of respondents favored vaccination in the base-line 
scenario we presented, (equally low risks of severe side-effects and of severe flu). Of 293 
respondents, 192 (65.3%) favored vaccination versus 73 (24.8%) who opposed it (χ2(1) = 
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53.44, p < .001). This tendency was still stronger when respondents considered the 
hypothetical case in which the vaccine risk was lower than the flu risk, 71.7% versus 
22.5%, but it reversed when the opposite balance of risks was suggested, 39.9% versus 
52.6% (Table 1). A 3(Risk: vaccine risk lower vs. equal risk vs. vaccine risk higher; 
within-subject) x 2(Sample: general population vs. students; between-subjects) repeated 
measures ANOVA of vaccination intention showed a significant main effect for Risk, 
(F(2, 582) = 57.05, p < .001), but no significant main effect for Sample, (F(1, 291) = 
1.85, ns) and no significant Risk x Sample interaction (F(2, 582) = 2.22, ns). Both 
pairwise differences were significant. Vaccination intention was higher when vaccine risk 
was lower than baseline (M =1.15, 0.84; t(292) = 2.62, p<.01), and lower when vaccine 
risk was higher than baseline (M = -0.34, 0.84; t(292) = 9.28, p<.001). Vaccination 
intention was reliably greater than zero for both baseline (t(293) = 7.34, p<.001) and low 
vaccine risk (t(292) = 9.79, p<.001) conditions, and reliably negative (t(292) = 2.63, 
p<.01) for the high vaccine risk condition. The pattern of results thus suggests an 
appropriate sensitivity to relative risks, with a majority in favor of vaccination when the 
risks are equal. Given the substantial similarity in vaccination intentions for the two 
subject pools, subsequent findings will be reported only for the pooled samples unless 
significant differences were found in the analysis.  
[Table 1 about here] 
 The size of the pro-vaccination majority is moderated by the perceived relative 
seriousness of the flu symptoms and the vaccine side-effects. The scenario described the 
two bad outcomes as equally serious. Both involved “high fevers, a lot of pain, and 
generally feeling horrible”, and were described as “very similar”. (Since our interest is in 
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realistic vaccination decisions, no effort was made to equate or eliminate other aspects of 
these outcomes the respondents may have thought relevant). Of a pooled total of 290 
respondents, a majority (n=175 or 60.3%) rated the flu and the vaccine side-effects 
equally serious. Among these a majority favored vaccination (53.7% vs. 34.9% opposed, 
χ2 = 7.03, p<.01), and mean vaccination intention was significantly positive (M = .33, 
t(174) = 2.16, p < .05). A substantial minority of respondents (n = 92, 31.2%) rated the 
flu as more serious than the vaccine side-effects, presumably considering other factors as 
well as those specified in the scenario. These respondents were overwhelmingly in favor 
of vaccination (90.2% in favor, 3.3% opposed, χ2(1) = 78.4, p < .001). Even among those 
few who saw the side-effects as more serious than the flu symptoms (n = 23, 7.8%) there 
was a slight tendency to favor vaccination (56.5% in favor, 39.1% opposed), but this 
difference was not statistically significant (χ2(1) = .73, ns). This pattern of results (Table 
2) suggests that perceptions of the relative seriousness of flu and side effects are 
systematically related to vaccination intentions. In fact, the two measures are 
significantly correlated, r = .31, p < .001. The more serious the flu is perceived to be in 
comparison to the vaccine side-effects, the stronger the intention to vaccinate.  
There is thus evidence of at least some degree of thoughtful risk-balancing in the 
overall pattern of responses, with enthusiasm for vaccination appropriately related both to 
relative probabilities and to perceived relative seriousness of the possible bad outcomes. 
The overall tendency is to prefer vaccination: When vaccination and non-vaccination 
present equally serious risks at equal probabilities, vaccination is preferred in both pools 
of respondents by a substantial majority.  
[Table 2 about here] 
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 Are these vaccination intentions consistent with the respondents’ expectations of 
the feelings of regret they would experience over poor outcomes from either vaccinating 
or not vaccinating? To assess this we used the single-item measures of regret in the 
questionnaire. (We have also replicated the following analyses with a five-item regret 
index developed by Connolly & Reb (2001), which includes measures of shame, 
dissatisfaction with self, guilt and self-blame as well as the regret measure. The results 
using these index measures were at least as strong as the single-item results reported here, 
and will be omitted for brevity). Mean scores on (1) regret associated with a poor 
vaccination outcome, and (2) regret associated with a poor non-vaccination outcome are 
shown in Figure 1 plotted against respondents’ vaccination intentions.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
 As Figure 1 suggests, those strongly favoring vaccination tend to see vaccination 
side-effects as much less regrettable than they see the flu itself. Those strongly opposed 
to vaccination see the reverse balance. A simple linear regression model including the 
two regret ratings as well as the seriousness ratings as independent variables and 
vaccination intention as dependent variable showed all three regression coefficients 
significantly different from zero, with an overall adjusted R2 of .24 (Table 3). This 
suggests that subjects distinguish between the relative seriousness of the possible 
outcomes and their relative regrettability, and use both assessments in arriving at their 
decisions on whether or not to vaccinate. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Figure 1 also clarifies a potentially misleading result in between-subject studies of 
the relationship between action and regret. For our sample as a whole, non-vaccination 
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(inaction) regret is higher than vaccination (action) regret (M = 6.74, 6.08; t(290) = 2.98,  
p < .01), an apparent reversal of several earlier findings. As Figure 1 shows, however, 
this overall difference is simply the result of the pro-vaccination majority among our 
respondents, combined with the regret differences shown. There are simply more pro-
vaccination respondents (who see the flu as more regrettable) than there are anti-
vaccination respondents (who see vaccine side-effects as more regrettable). 
Since half of the respondents stated their vaccination intentions after, the other 
half before, rating their anticipated emotions, we were able to check for the possibility of 
priming effects by building separate regression models of vaccination intent for those 
respondents who assessed emotions first and those who assessed emotions last. The 
regression coefficients for both regret measures were larger when emotions were assessed 
before vaccination intentions than when they were assessed after: For regret associated 
with vaccine side-effects, Beta = -24, -.09 (z = 2.17, p<.05, one-tailed); for regret 
associated with flu, Beta = .31, .19 (z = 1.68, p<.05, one-tailed). The emotions-first 
model, similarly, predicted more of the variance in vaccination intent than did the 
emotions-after model (a marginally significant result: adjusted R2 = .31, .18; z = 1.42, 
p<.1, one-tailed). This suggests a possible priming effect: Vaccination intentions may 
have been more strongly influenced by regret anticipations for respondents who 
considered their emotions before they made their vaccination decisions. 
 
Discussion 
 A number of earlier studies have been interpreted as demonstrating “omission 
bias”, a broad tendency to prefer inactive to active decision options, even when the latter 
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offer lower risks or better payoffs. If such a tendency were widely shared, it would raise 
the worrying possibility that important decisions, including such medical decisions as 
whether or not to vaccinate a child, might be biased towards inaction rather than action 
when risks and consequences are comparable. Since much of the concern on this issue 
was initially raised by scenario-based studies of vaccination decisions, our first purpose 
in this study was simply to reassess the prevalence pro- and anti-vaccination views in two 
populations: students and the general adult population.  A second purpose was to explore 
the possibility that regret avoidance might offer a more compelling account of 
vaccination preferences than does a hypothetical general aversion to taking action (i.e. 
“omission bias”). 
 We suspected (and methodological studies reported in Appendix 2 confirm) that  
the risk balancing measures used in earlier studies might have produced misleading 
results. We wanted to avoid asking the subjects to make complex tradeoffs among 
probabilities and utilities of good and bad outcomes. We therefore used a simplified 
scenario in which a vaccine offered a child complete protection from a disease, but at risk 
of side-effects similar to the symptoms of the disease, and where the risks of disease and 
side-effects were equal. A respondent attempting to minimize risk to the child, and 
considering only the outcomes and probabilities specified, should be indifferent between 
accepting or declining vaccination in this scenario. Even a modest tendency towards 
inaction (an “omission bias”) would then be reflected in a predominance of anti-
vaccination choices.  
Our findings, however, showed a clear pro-vaccination majority, in both 
respondent pools, for respondents who rated disease and vaccine side-effects equally. 
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Respondents who rated the disease effects as more serious were pro-vaccination by a 
huge majority. Even those who rated the vaccine side-effects as more serious were still 
somewhat in favor of vaccination. Overall enthusiasm for vaccination responded in the 
appropriate direction to modified scenarios in which relative probabilities of the poor 
outcomes were increased or decreased. In aggregate, therefore, participants responded in 
the appropriate direction to differences in relative seriousness and relative risk of poor 
outcomes, but with a marked overall tendency to favor vaccination rather than oppose it, 
towards commission rather than omission.  
For reasons discussed earlier we see no reason to conclude that these preferences 
reflect “bias”, whether of omission or commission. It seems likely that many, perhaps 
most, of the respondents brought to the problem considerations additional to those 
specified in the scenario. A substantial minority judged the flu more serious than the 
vaccine side-effects, suggesting the influence of outside, non-scenario considerations 
such as those discussed earlier. We simply do not know what non-scenario factors 
(possibly including generalized preferences for action or inaction) influenced individual 
decisions and by how much, so we can form no assessment of whether or not their 
inclusion constituted an error or bias. The evidence shows only that there were such 
influences and that, in aggregate, they led a majority of our respondents to prefer 
vaccination to non-vaccination.  
 Our data do provide a partial picture of our respondents’ decision processes. We 
found that intention to vaccinate or not was predicted by three measures: the respondent’s 
assessment of the relative seriousness of the disease and the vaccine side-effects; her 
assessment of the regret she would feel if vaccination turned out badly; and her 
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assessment of the regret she would feel if non-vaccination turned out badly. Overall 
respondents tended to view the disease as more serious than the side-effects of the 
vaccine, and to judge a bad non-vaccination outcome as more regrettable than a bad 
vaccination outcome. The majority were thus, on balance, inclined towards vaccination. 
As Figure 1 shows, both vaccinators and non-vaccinators chose the option they saw as 
less regrettable. 
We further probed the robustness of these findings with two smaller studies, using 
student samples. In the first (N = 69) we modified the scenario to eliminate the issue of 
decision agency on behalf of the child. The participants were asked about the vaccination 
choices they would make for themselves, if the vaccine were free and easily available. In 
the base-line scenario the choices were balanced (31 in favor of vaccination, 31 opposed). 
They were strongly pro-vaccination if side-effect risks were to drop: 53 (76.8%) in favor, 
13 (18.8%) opposed (χ2(1) = 24.24, p < .001), and strongly opposed if side-effect risks 
were to rise: 60 (87.0%) opposed, 6 (8.7%) in favor (χ2(1) = 44.18, p < .001). As in the 
main study, we found that both expected regret over a bad vaccination outcome (β = -.21, 
p < .09) and over a bad non-vaccination outcome (β = .39, p < .01) were significant 
predictors of vaccination intention. 
We also asked these respondents to explain, in open-ended form, how they had 
arrived at their vaccination decisions. The responses were independently coded by two 
coders, using the categories shown in Table 4. The coders agreed on 87% of their initial 
codings; remaining differences were resolved by discussion. As Table 4 shows, the 
commonest explanations involved general statements of trying to balance the risks and 
benefits of the two options (associated with both pro- and anti-vaccination choices); fear 
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or dislike of shots or drugs in general, or the inconvenience or cost of getting them 
(strongly associated with anti-vaccination choices); and specific advantages of 
vaccination such as control of timing or freedom from worry about flu exposures 
(associated with pro-vaccination choices). Strikingly, only two of the 69 respondents 
made any mention of issues related to action or inaction per se. One anti-vaccination 
respondent said: “I am a firm believer in leaving things to fate and not messing with 
fate”. One pro-vaccination respondent said: “If you vaccinate, whether or not you got any 
symptoms, you were still trying to help yourself. If you didn’t vaccinate and you got sick 
then I would definitely be upset with myself because I didn’t get a vaccination”. None of 
the other 67 respondents mentioned action/inaction issues at all.  
[Table 4 about here] 
In the second follow-up study (N = 66) we modified the scenario so that the bad 
outcomes of both disease and side effects were the child dying, rather than becoming 
sick, to replicate more closely the scenarios used by Asch et al. (1994), Meszaros et al 
(1996), and Ritov and Baron (1992). As in the main study, only a minority (24 or 36.4%) 
opposed vaccination in this version, while 29 respondents (45.3%) favored it (χ2(1) = .5, 
ns). A hypothetical reduction of the side-effects risk raised the pro-vaccination majority 
to 56 (84.8%) versus 8 (12.1%) opposed (χ2(1) = 36.00, p < .001). A hypothetical 
increase in the risk of side-effects generated a large anti-vaccination majority: 59 (89.4%) 
opposed, 3 (4.5%) in favor (χ2(1) = 50.60, p < .001). In short, these subjects again 
showed an appropriate sensitivity to relative risk of flu and side-effects, with a modest 
overall tendency in favor of vaccination. In addition, both regret after vaccinating (β = -
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.24, p < .06) and after not vaccinating (β = .25, p < .05) were again significant predictors 
of vaccination intention. 
Coding of the open-ended explanations using a slightly more elaborate scheme 
(Table 5) showed acceptable inter-coder reliability (initial agreement 83%), with 
disagreements resolved by discussion. As before the predominant explanation mentioned 
some form of risk and benefit balancing. Five pro-vaccinators (8% of respondents) 
expressed general pro-vaccine beliefs; four non-vaccinators (6%) argued that their child’s 
risks were or could be made lower than the population risk; and four undecided 
respondents, perhaps budding academics, suggested that more research was needed. As 
before, few respondents (5 of 66, 8%) mentioned action/inaction per se.  One, a non-
vaccinator, said “I’d feel horrible if I did something (made a choice) that caused death. 
Even worse than if it naturally happened”. Three pro-vaccinators mentioned 
action/inaction issues. One said: “I would want to feel like I did my best to prevent harm 
to my child. I would rather vaccinate if it would reduce the risk of getting the flu”. A 
second said: “Because if you vaccinate you are taking an active step and not being 
passive”. A third said: “I feel that precautions are necessary in this case, and that trying to 
protect the well-being of someone else is more worthwhile than chancing exposure”. 
Finally, one respondent, who was undecided on whether or not to vaccinate, said: “If my 
child died from the flu it would be a natural cause. If my child died from the vaccine, it 
would be because of my choice – not nature doing its own stuff”. None of the remaining 
61 respondents mentioned action/inaction per se as an element in his or her vaccination 
decision. As before, it appears that action/inaction was a salient issue for very few of our 
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respondents. For those who did mention the issue, it was at least as likely to point 
towards vaccination as towards non-vaccination. 
[Table 5 about here] 
We are, for obvious reasons, hesitant to extrapolate the results of this study to 
actual vaccination decisions. It does not appear that student samples are much different 
from the general public in responses to vaccination-related scenarios. It is, however, 
unclear what relationship exists between the hypothetical decisions reported in scenario 
studies and the actual decisions adults make for their own real children, or for 
themselves. There is some modest evidence showing the two are related. Both Asch et al. 
(1994) and Meszaros et al. (1996) found a significant relationship between self-reported 
use of DPT vaccine and the risk-balancing measure of reluctance to vaccinate discussed 
earlier.  If that measure is accepted at face value, these data show that subscribers to 
Mothering magazine are at least modestly consistent in their self-reports of their behavior 
in the real world of DPT vaccine and in the hypothetical world of the vaccination 
scenario. We have no evidence on the validity of these self-reports. 
  One of the concerns that motivated this study was the suggestion that an 
“omission bias” was deflecting parents from seeking advantageous vaccinations for their 
children. We are somewhat reassured on this score.  Given a scenario in which flu and 
vaccine risks were balanced, most respondents, students and adults alike, chose to 
vaccinate (i.e. take action), suggesting that, whatever general tendency towards inaction 
or omission there may be, it is not sufficiently strong to overwhelm pro-vaccination 
factors for most people. The respondents showed reasonable sensitivity to relative 
seriousness and relative risk of the disease and the vaccine side-effects. They also showed 
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some sensitivity to the regret they expected to feel if these bad outcomes were to 
eventuate, and made predominantly regret-averse choices – which, in this case, led a 
majority to pro-vaccination decisions, though a substantial minority were opposed. Two 
follow-up studies in which respondents chose on their own behalf, or for a child where 
the risks were fatal, showed similarly little evidence of any general tendency toward 
inaction, and very few respondents mentioned such factors in explaining their decisions. 
Those who did were at least as likely to favor vaccination as to oppose it. Again, 
respondents in these follow-up studies showed regret aversion, regardless of their 
choices.  
 Since our findings contrast sharply with the earlier findings of omission bias in 
vaccination decisions, we conducted several methodological studies of the measures used 
(Appendix 2). These studies show that two features of the earlier measures – the 
truncation of probability response scales, and the asymmetry of open-response matching 
scales – could well have produced inadvertent bias in the earlier studies. More broadly, 
they suggest that complex risk-balancing of the kind called for in both matching and 
choice measures may be simply too complex for many respondents. Measures that in one 
form show substantial vaccine aversion show exactly the reverse after apparently 
harmless modification, and intendedly convergent measures of the same construct fail 
even rudimentary tests of consistency. In short, while respondents do generally respond 
in appropriate directions to increased risk or seriousness of one or other of the outcomes 
of the vaccination decision, their numerical estimates of the risk balancing involved 
should be treated with considerable caution. 
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Overall we find no evidence for either “omission” or for “bias” as shaping 
vaccination decisions. The data suggest, instead, that both pro- and anti-vaccination 
decisions are shaped, in part, by regret avoidance. There is, of course, debate as to 
whether regret-avoidance of this sort is normatively proper (for example Bittner, 1992) 
but there seems little question that it does influence real choices (e.g. Zeelenberg, 1999). 
There is also evidence that regret expectations can be shaped by considerations of what is 
normal (Zeelenberg et al., 2001; Kahneman & Miller, 1986); by the justifying rationales 
the decision maker has available (Connolly & Reb, 2001; Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002); 
and even by direct persuasion (Baron, 1992). This suggests that efforts to influence 
vaccination decisions might be usefully targeted at regret expectations, and the 
justifications for action and inaction on which they depend. Issues of action and inaction 
per se do not seem to have a very substantial role in vaccination decisions, at least to the 
extent that these decisions are well represented by simplified scenario-based studies of 
the sort reported here. Within the obvious limitations of such studies, the answers to both 
the questions in our title seem to be negative: it is difficult to make a convincing case that 
either “omission” or “bias” has been demonstrated in the vaccination setting.  
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Table 1 
Numbers of Respondents Indicating Pro- & Anti-Vaccination Intentions versus Relative 
Risk of Vaccine Side-Effects and Flu 
  Relative Risk of Vaccine Side-Effects and Flu 
  If Vaccine          
Risk Higher 
Base-Line          
Scenario 
If Vaccine         
Risk Lower Vaccination  
Intention n Percent n Percent n Percent 
 Negative* 154 52.6% 73 24.8% 66 22.5% 
 Don’t know 22 7.5% 29 9.9% 17 5.8% 
 Positive 117 39.9% 192 65.3% 210 71.7% 
 Total 293 100% 294 100% 293 100% 
        
* “Negative” includes all responses from –1 to –3 (i.e. anti-vaccination); “Positive” 
includes all responses from +1 to +3 (i.e. pro-vaccination). 
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Table 2  
Numbers of Respondents Indicating Pro- & Anti-Vaccination Intentions versus Perceived 
Relative Seriousness of Side-Effects and Flu 
  Perceived Relative Seriousness of Side-Effects and Flu 
 Vaccination  
Intention 
Flu Less Serious Equally Serious Flu More Serious 
n Percent n Percent n Percent 
 Negative* 9 39.1% 61 34.9% 3 3.3% 
 Don’t know 1 4.3% 20 11.4% 6 6.5% 
 Positive 13 56.5% 94 53.7% 83 90.2% 
 Total 23 100% 175 100% 92 100% 
        
* “Negative” includes all responses from –1 to –3 (i.e. anti-vaccination); “Positive” 
includes all responses from +1 to +3 (i.e. pro-vaccination). 
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Table 3 
Summary of Regression Model Predicting Intention to Vaccinate from Regret Scores and 
Rated Relative Seriousness of Side-Effects and Flu 
           Variable B SE B β 
Rated Relative Seriousness of 
Side-Effects and Flu** 
.81 .18 .24* 
Vaccination Regret -.15 .03 -.25* 
Non-Vaccination Regret .24 .04 .38* 
Note. Adjusted R2 = .24 (N = 287, p < .001). 
* p < .001. 
** A rating of flu symptoms as less serious than the side-effects was coded as -1, equally 
serious as 0, and more serious as 1. 
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Table 4 
Coding of open-ended explanations given for vaccination decisions in first follow-up 
study (vaccination for oneself) 
 
        Decision 
      Don’t  Don’t  Vaccinate 
      Vaccinate Know 
      (N = 31) (N = 7) (N = 31) 
1. Fear, dislike, distrust, cost or     10      0      1  
    trouble of shots or drugs 
 
2. Balance of risks and/or benefits      12      2    14 
 
3. Control of timing or certainty of        0       0      4 
    outcomes, reduce worry 
 
4. Risks of flu, side-effects or both        3      0      3 
     are low. 
 
5. My chances are generally better/worse       5      0      1 
    than those in scenario 
 
6. One should not be passive         0       0      1 
 
7. One should not mess with fate        1      0      0 
 
8. Other, and uncodable         6      4      5 
 
9. No explanation given         1     1       3       
 
 
 
 
 
 41
Table 5 
Coding of open-ended explanations given for vaccination decisions in second follow-up 
study (worst outcome is child’s death) 
        Decision 
      Don’t  Don’t  Vaccinate 
      Vaccinate Know 
      (N = 24) (N = 13) (N = 29) 
1. Fear, dislike, distrust, cost or        1      0      0  
    trouble of shots or drugs 
 
2. Balance of risks and/or benefits      14      2    15 
 
3. Control of timing or certainty of        0       0      1 
    outcomes, reduce worry 
 
4. Risks of flu, side-effects or both        1      0      0 
     are low. 
 
5. My child’s chances are generally        0      0      0 
    better/worse than those in scenario 
 
6. One should not be passive         0       0      3 
 
7. One should not mess with fate        1      1      0 
 
8. Other vaccine drawbacks (e.g. new &       2      0      0 
    untested, possible long-term risks) 
 
9. I could control risks (move, give special       4      0      0 
    care, child may not be exposed) 
 
10.More research is needed         0      4      0 
 
11. Generalized belief in vaccine  benefits       0      0      5 
 
12. Other and uncodable         2      6      6 
 
13. No explanation given         0     0       0       
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Figure 1  
Mean Regret Scores versus Intention to Vaccinate 
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Appendix 1 
 
The vaccination decision may be modeled as a binary choice under risk, of the 
following form. A decision is to be made between two alternatives A1(Vaccinate) and A2 
(Do not vaccinate). A1 leads with probability P1 to a “good” outcome G1 (Child healthy) 
and with probability (1-P1) to a “bad” outcome B1 (Child sick). Alternative A2, 
similarly, offers {G2, P2; B2, (1-P2)}. Assuming a decision maker with utilities U(.) for 
these outcomes, he or she will be indifferent between A1 and A2 iff 
 
 P1*U(G1) + (1-P1)*U(B1) = P2*U(G2) + (1-P2)*U(B2)    (1) 
 
The numerical values of P1 and P2 at which a subject feels indifferent between A1 and 
A2 thus cast some light on his or her utilities for the four outcomes. If one is prepared to 
make the further assumption that U(G1) = U(G2), (that is, one is equally pleased with the 
child’s health, whether it resulted from good luck or from benefits of the vaccination) 
then the indifference ratio of P1 to P2 can be used as a coarse measure of the relative size 
of U(B1) and U(B2), (the utilities associated with a child sick or dead from the vaccine 
and the child sick or dead from the flu). Our interpretation of the “omission bias” 
literature is that it concerns the relative size of these two utilities. 
In the risk balancing procedure, the experimenter specifies one of the two 
probabilities and asks the subject for a value of the other probability which would make 
A1 and A2 equally attractive. For example, Asch et al. (1994) specified that the risk of 
inaction leading to flu fatality was 10 in 10,000. Their typical subject indicated 
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indifference between vaccination and non-vaccination if the death risk from vaccination 
was about 4 in 10,000. If one assumes that U(G1) = U(G2) and that P1 and P2 are both 
close to 1.0 (i.e. that death from either flu or vaccine is a rare event), the logic of 
Equation 1 implies that U(B1) is about 2.5 as large as U(B2) – that is, a vaccine-related 
death was judged to be about 2.5 times as bad as a flu-related death. The “risk premium” 
demanded for the vaccination option thus indexes the ratio of U(B1) and U(B2), as long 
as the logic of Equation 1 and the utility equivalence of G1 and G2 holds, as in the 
following example. 
 
Example 1: Suppose that a particular individual is indifferent between vaccination, with 
a risk of death of 5 in 10,000 and non-vaccination, with a risk of 10 in 10,000. We may, 
without loss of generality, assign each outcome a utility between 0 (Worst) and 1 (Best). 
Assume initially that U(G1) = U(G2) = 1  (i.e. the best possible outcome is a healthy 
child, and the parent does not care whether this is a result of vaccination or good luck). 
Assume also that U(B1) = 0 (i.e. the worst outcome is the child’s death resulting from 
vaccination). Then, substituting into Equation 1: 
 (9,995 x 1.0) + (5 x 0) = (9,990 x 1.0) + (10 x U(B2)) 
or:      U(B2) = 0.5 
That is, on a utility scale bounded at 0 (Worst: Vaccine-caused death) and 1 (Best: Child 
healthy), the flu-caused death is seen as at the mid-point. This is the basis for the 
comments in text that the vaccine-caused death outcome is some multiple as bad as the 
flu-caused death – in this case, twice as bad. 
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Example 2: Ritov & Baron (1990, Experiment 4) found their average subject indifferent 
between a vaccine risk of 10 in 100,000 and a flu risk of 2,584 in 100,000. By the same 
calculation as above, this corresponds to a U(B2) value of .996, indicating that the flu-
caused death is virtually as desirable as the two “best” outcomes! 
Example 3: Suppose we relax the assumption of equal “best” outcomes and allow instead 
for U(G1) to be slightly larger than U(G2) – that is, we allow a small measure of 
“rejoicing” (Landman, 1987; Loomes and Sugden, 1982), reflecting our extra pleasure in 
a good outcome that was the result of our actions. If, in Example 1, we keep U(G1) at 1.0 
and put U(G2) at .99 – a very tiny amount of rejoicing – Equation 1 solves with U(B2) = 
10.49, a meaningless value for a utility. Alternatively, given this same tiny amount of 
rejoicing, Equation 1 shows that vaccination, with its 5 in 10,000 death risk, will be 
preferred to non-vaccination even if there is no risk whatever of death from flu! 
Comment: We find the result from Example 1 to be reasonably intuitive, but those of 
Examples 2 and 3 to be quite surprising. Our intuition required some education before we 
grasped that these utility calculations are dominated by the values of the good (non-
death) outcomes, since they are so very much more likely that the bad (death) outcomes. 
It seems likely that actual subjects, like ourselves, tend to focus only on the undesirable 
branches of these options, without taking adequate account of the vastly more likely 
desirable branches. This ignoring of positive outcomes would constitute a much more 
serious decision error in such contexts than any modest distortion of the utilities of 
negative outcomes associated with action or inaction. 
 
 46
Appendix 2 
We report here three methodological studies examining properties of the measures 
used in these and earlier studies. Experiment M1 explores scale length effects, M2 
examines possible response differences due to matching versus choice formats, and M3 
alternative wordings and placement of the relative seriousness question. All three use a 
scenario slightly altered from that used in the main study, replacing some wording that 
we judged to be more natural-sounding with a more exactly parallel wording to describe 
disease and side-effect outcomes. The new wording was: 
“Imagine that in Arizona there have been several outbreaks of a certain kind of 
flu, which can cause severe illness in children under three. Most children get no flu 
symptoms at all but, in a small number of cases, the flu causes serious symptoms, the 
child gets quite sick and feels seriously ill for several weeks. 
There is a vaccine for this type of flu. The vaccine is available at no cost and 
eliminates all possibility of the child getting the flu. It generally has no side-effects. 
However, in a small number of cases, the vaccine causes serious side-effects, the child 
gets quite sick and feels seriously ill for several weeks. 
Imagine that you are married and have one child, a one-year old. You spent a lot 
of time trying to decide whether or not to have your child vaccinated against this flu. 
After talking to several doctors, reading medical journals and consulting with friends, it’s 
now time to decide whether to have your child vaccinated or not”. 
 
Experiment M1: Scale length effects 
 After reading the above scenario, participants were told the flu risk (10 in 10,000) 
and asked a series of choice questions of the form “Would you vaccinate your child if the 
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probability of getting severe vaccine side-effects were X ?” Values of X were displayed 
one to a line (0 in 10,000, 1 in 10,000, etc), and the respondent was asked to circle either 
“Yes” or “No” for each. A final page asked our standard relative seriousness question. 
Two factors were varied in a full 2x2 factorial design: 
a. Scale length: In the short form, respondents were asked about vaccine risks 
between 0 in 10,000 and 10 in 10,000. In the long form, risks ranged from 0 in 
10,000 to 20 in 10,000, with a final category “>20 in 10,000”. 
b. Scale direction: Half the respondents saw scales that ranged upward from 0 in 
10,000 to the maximum value, the others saw scales that ranged downward from 
their maximum to 0. 
Seventy-nine student respondents completed the two-page questionnaire as part of a 
larger package of unrelated studies. They received course credit in return for their 
participation. 
Results: 
 The primary dependent variable was the highest vaccine risk at which the 
respondent would choose to vaccinate. The distribution of responses for short and long 
forms of the scale is summarized in Table M1. As can be seen, responses on the short 
form of the scale suggest that almost half of our respondents demanded a risk premium 
for vaccination (M = 7.9, N = 40), which earlier studies would have been interpreted as 
evidence of “omission bias”. However, responses on the long form suggest the reverse, 
with a majority of respondents indicating that they would accept a risk penalty in order to 
vaccinate (M = 14.8, N = 39). (Responses of “>20” were conservatively coded as 21). A 
Scale Length (2) x Scale Direction (2) ANOVA shows a highly significant main effect 
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for Scale Length (F(1,75) = 34.48, p = .000), but no main effect for Direction (F<1.0) or 
for the interaction of Length and Direction (F<1.0).  
[Table M1 about here] 
 As in the main study, the majority (54%) of our respondents judged flu symptoms 
and vaccine side-effects as equally serious overall, with a substantial minority (35%) 
judging flu symptoms more serious and few (10%) judging the reverse. These judgments 
were unrelated to scale length. 12 of 40 short-scale respondents, versus 16 of 39 long-
form respondents, judged the flu symptoms more serious (chi squared = 1.05, ns). They 
were, however, related to vaccination intentions. Those judging the flu more serious were 
prepared to accept higher vaccine risks in both the short form (M = 9.67 vs. 7.14, t = 
2.53, p<.02) and the long form (M = 18.56 vs. 12.17, t = 3.32, p = .000) than were those 
who judged the two equally serious or the vaccine side-effects more serious. 
Conclusions. 
 We found no effect for scale direction (rising or falling risk levels), but we did 
find a large and important effect for scale length. Respondents restricted to vaccine risk 
options at or below the flu risk appeared to demand a risk premium to vaccinate. 
However, those not so restricted showed the opposite tendency, indicating that they 
would tolerate a risk penalty in order to vaccinate. Such response biases are not new, of 
course (see, for example, Loftus, 1975), but are of substantive importance in the present 
context, and could account for several earlier findings of “omission bias”. In both scale 
formats, respondents who judged flu symptoms as more serious than vaccine side-effects 
are more tolerant of vaccine risk than those who see the side effects as equally or more 
serious. This suggests that respondents are able to see the directional implications of the 
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risks and payoffs they confront, but that expressing this understanding in numerical terms 
is strongly influenced by demand characteristics such as scale length.  
 
Experiment M2: Matching and choice 
 Two alternative response formats have been used in risk-balancing measures. The 
choice format, such as that described in Experiment M1, presents the respondent with a 
series of choices of the form “The flu risk is X, the vaccine risk is Y, would you 
vaccinate or not?” The alternative, matching format specifies one of the two risks and 
asks the respondent to indicate the value of the other risk at which he or she would be 
indifferent between vaccinating and not vaccinating. In either format the researcher 
anchors on one of the two risks and asks the respondent to provide the other, either by 
selecting a value from those offered (in choice format) or by supplying a value for it (in 
matching format). In this experiment we presented respondents with both a matching and 
a choice task, factorially crossing which anchor appeared in which response mode. 
Respondents thus answered in both a matching format (anchored on a specified value of 
flu or side-effect risk) and in a choice format (anchored on either flu or side-effect risk). 
A total of 80 undergraduate student respondents completed the three-page questionnaire 
as part of a larger package of unrelated studies. They received course credit for their 
participation. 
 The first page in each package was a matching task. One group of participants 
was given the vaccine risk (10 in 10,000) and asked to fill in a number (“___ in 10,000”) 
for the flu risk at which they would be indifferent between vaccination and non-
vaccination. The second group was given the flu risk and asked for a vaccine risk at 
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which they would be indifferent. The second page of each package was a set of choice 
tasks. Half the respondents were told the side-effects risk (10 in 10,000) and given a 
series of yes/no choices of whether or not they would vaccinate if the flu risk were 0, 1, 2 
… 20 in 10,000, with a final category of >20. The lowest flu risk at which they would 
vaccinate was taken as their balance point. The remaining respondents were told the flu 
risk (10 in 10,000) and given a series of yes/no questions for the same range of side-
effect risks. The highest side-effect risk at which they would vaccinate was taken as their 
balance point.  
Results. 
Responses for the matching task are summarized in Table M2(a). As the table 
shows, when the question is anchored on vaccine side-effect risk, respondents tend to be 
predominantly opposed to vaccination (20 respondents would vaccinate only if the flu 
risk were higher than the vaccine risk versus 8 showing the reverse). However, when the 
question is anchored on flu risk, there is an opposite, pro-vaccine tendency, with 18 
respondents selecting the vaccine even if it is riskier than the flu, while only 8 demand a 
risk premium for vaccination. 
[Table M2(a) about here] 
 Responses for the choice task are summarized in Table M2-1(b). As before, the 
appearance of pro- or anti-vaccine tendency changes with question anchoring.  
Respondents anchored on a value of vaccine risk and choosing at various levels of flu 
risk show moderate vaccine-aversion: 22 demand a risk premium to vaccinate, only 11 
vaccinate when the flu risks are lower that the vaccine risks. Respondents anchored on a 
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flu risk and choosing at various levels of vaccine risk show the reverse tendency: 20 
choose vaccination even when it is riskier that the flu, versus 11 choosing the reverse.  
[Table M2(b) about here] 
Consistency between the matching and choice responses depended on whether or 
not the two responses used the same anchor. Respondents anchored on the same risk (flu 
risk-flu risk or vaccine risk-vaccine risk) for their matching and choice tasks achieved 
moderate consistency. 19/40 respondents gave the same risk level at their balance or 
indifference points, and the two responses were highly correlated (Spearman’s rho = .73, 
p=.000). However, when matching and choice were based on different anchors (matching 
anchored on flu risk, choice anchored on vaccine risk, or vice versa), consistency was 
much poorer. Only 11 of 40 responses matched exactly, and the two measures, which 
should, for consistency, have shown a negative correlation, were actually positively 
correlated (rho = .43, p=.006). 
Conclusion. 
 These data suggest, as in Experiment M1, that risk-balancing responses need to be 
treated with considerable caution. Whether a matching format or a choice format is used, 
the apparent overall preference shifts depending on whether the flu risk or the vaccine 
risk is used as the anchor. The fill-in-the-blank format of the matching response does 
allow for some quite extreme responses (in our most extreme example, a readiness to use 
a vaccine with a 90% probability of causing harm to protect against a flu with a 0.1% 
probability of causing harm!). Some of these extreme responses very likely represent 
simple error, but it is not clear which responses indicate error, which indicate extreme but 
sincere views. The matching and choice responses show moderate consistency with one 
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another when the two tasks have the same anchor (e.g. state flu risk for matching, and 
choose for various levels of flu risk), but are quite inconsistent when the two tasks have 
different anchors (e.g. match using flu risk, but choose for various levels of vaccine risk). 
In short, neither response format yields consistent pro- or anti-vaccine response 
tendencies when used alone, and the two are too mutually inconsistent to be used in 
combination. It has been known for some time (e.g. Slovic, 1975) that matching and 
choice can produce inconsistent results. As the present data show, either response mode 
is capable of indicating either pro- or anti-vaccination tendencies, depending on which 
risk is used as anchor, which as response variable. Again, response-mode effects could 
account for apparent omission bias in several earlier studies. 
 
Experiment M3: Wording and placement of seriousness question 
 We tested two alternative wordings of the seriousness question. The first asked, as 
in the main study, whether the flu symptoms are more serious, just as serious, or less 
serious overall than the vaccine side effects. The second wording asked whether the 
vaccine side-effects are more serious, just as serious, or less serious overall than the flu 
symptoms. We also tested the effect of placing the seriousness question immediately after 
the scenario, before asking for decisions on vaccination preference, versus after these 
preference questions. These two factors were crossed factorially, for a 2x2 design with 20 
participants in each cell. As in the main study, respondents were asked their vaccination 
intentions for the scenario as presented and for two alternative scenarios, one in which 
the side-effect risk was higher than the flu risk, and one in which the side-effect risk was 
 53
lower. Eighty undergraduate students completed the three-page questionnaire as part of a 
larger package of unrelated studies. They received course credit for their participation. 
Results. 
 There is no evidence that the wording of the seriousness question had any effect 
on response patterns (see Table M3). In both wordings, the majority of respondents 
judged the two risks to be equal (21 or 22 of 40), with a substantial minority (15 or 16 of 
40) judging the flu more serious (or the vaccine side effects less). Only 3 respondents in 
each wording judged the flu less risky than the vaccine. Nor was there any effect of either 
wording or placement of the seriousness question on vaccination intentions. A two-way 
ANOVA showed no significant effect on vaccination intention for either Wording (F 
<1.0), Order (F < 1.0) or their interaction (F <1.0). 
[Table M3 about here] 
 As in the main study, there was a clear effect on vaccination intention for both 
judged relative seriousness of flu and side-effects and for relative risk of the two. Those 
judging the flu more serious (or the vaccine less) were more likely (M = 1.87) to 
vaccinate than those who felt the risks equal (M = 0.86) or reversed (M = .50) (F(3,74) = 
3.66, p<.02). For the hypothetical case in which the vaccine risk was lower than the flu 
risk, mean vaccination intention rose from 1.27, its baseline, to 2.29. For the hypothetical 
in which the vaccine risk was higher, it fell to -1.05. That is, as in the main study, 
vaccination intention responds in the appropriate direction to both judged relative 
seriousness of flu and vaccine, and to manipulations of the relative risks. There appears to 
be no effect for either wording or placement of the seriousness question. 
Conclusion 
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 Judgments of the relative seriousness of the flu and the vaccine side-effects do not 
appear to be affected by either wording or placement of the seriousness question. As in 
the main study, most respondents see the risks as equally serious, with a substantial 
minority judging flu more serious and few respondents judging the reverse. Further, 
neither the placement nor the wording of the seriousness question affects vaccination 
intentions. It seems, then, that judgments of seriousness are a relatively stable result of (a) 
the respondent’s reading of our scenario (here carefully worded to equate the two 
possible bad outcomes) and (b) more general knowledge and opinions, predominantly 
pro-vaccine, that he or she brings to the experiment. There is no evidence that seriousness 
judgments reflect simple post-decision bolstering. 
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Table M1: Highest acceptable side-effect risk for short and long response scales 
 
 
 
Highest Acceptable  Short Scale  Long Scale 
SE Risk (in 10,000)     (0 to 10)                     (0 to >21) 
 
  0    1   2 
  1    1 
  2    1 
  3    3   1 
  4    1 
  5    5 
  6    2 
  7    1 
  8       1 
  9    4   4 
  10    23   9 
  11       1 
  15       1 
  20       6 
  >20       14 
  ____________________________________________ 
  Total    40   39 
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Table M2(a): Matching responses for flu-risk vs. side-effect-risk anchors 
 
 
 
 
 
 Matching     Anchor: SE risk    Anchor: Flu risk 
 Response      = 10 in 10,000     = 10 in 10,000 
 (i.e. enter flu risk)  (i.e. enter SE risk) 
 
 1 in 10,000   3    3 
 2 “   1    1 
 5 “   4    3 
 9 “       1 
 10 “   11    14 
 11 “       1 
 15 “   2    1 
 20 “       1 
 30 “   1    
 50 “   1    3 
 100 “   8    6 
 200 “       1 
 500 “   4     
 1,000 “   3    1 
 3,000 “       1 
 5,000 “   1    2 
 9,000 “       1 
 ___________________________________________________ 
 Total    39    40 
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Table M2(b): Choice responses for flu-risk and side-effect-risk anchors 
 
  
 
 
 Choice Balancing  Anchor: SE risk  Anchor: Flu risk 
  Risk     =10 in 10,000    = 10 in 10,000 
     (i.e. circle flu risk)  (i.e. circle SE risk) 
 
      0 in 10,000    3 
      1     “    1    1 
      4         “    1    1 
      5         “    3    4 
      6         “    1 
      9         “    2    5 
      10       “    7    9 
      11       “    4 
      14       “    1    2 
      15       “    4    3 
      19       “        2 
      20       “    4    4 
     >20      “    9    9 
 
     ________________________________________________________ 
         Total    40    40 
 58
Table M3: Ratings of flu and side-effect seriousness for alternative question wordings 
 
 
     Seriousness Ratings 
 
Question  Flu more serious Both equally  SE  more serious 
Wording     (or SE less)      serious      (or flu less) 
 
Flu vs. SE   15          22   3 
 
SE vs. Flu   16          21   3   
 
